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Abstract
In this article, the authors look at the decoupling debate with respect to East 
Asia from an economic and a political economy perspective. Looking at various 
methods, they ﬁnd little evidence to support a secular decoupling hypothesis, 
that is, the proposition that there is a long-term trend towards a decoupling of 
the East Asian region. In this context, they present fresh evidence on GDP data 
up to the second quarter of 2009, incorporating some of the impact of the recent 
ﬁnancial crisis. They ﬁnd evidence in favour of a cyclical relationship: decoupling 
during economic upturns and re-coupling during downturns. They also look 
at the sources for the strong interest in the concept, drawing some parallels to 
the older concept of the ﬂying geese pattern of development. Key factors are 
the activity of ﬁnancial analysts and the interest of some policy circles in the 
region to support calls for further regional integration with putative empirical 
evidence. The debate on decoupling captures some interesting points about the 
peculiar political and economic exchange on the regional level. Nevertheless, 
the authors conclude that seemingly detached economic reasoning is often sub-
ject to over- and even misinterpretation and should be accompanied by more 
political economy-based reasoning on the discursive patterns of the debate. 
Keywords: decoupling, East Asia, regional integration, ﬁnancial crisis, business cycles
Introduction
In recent years, East Asia has become a cornerstone of the global economy 
due to the phenomenal growth of its gross domestic product (GDP) and 
of its outward-oriented trade activities. A major engine of this growth 
has been the external ﬁnal demand created in the Western world, by the 
US and Western Europe in particular. More recently, however, it has 
been asked whether the East Asian economies have begun to decouple 
from ﬁnal demand in the West and have thus started to develop their 
indigenous growth dynamics. Following the global ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic crisis, it has also been asked to what extent such trends persist. 
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A positive answer might have considerable implications for trade and 
industrial policies of the regional economies. Identifying decoupling 
could serve as a powerful argument to support a regionalist integration 
strategy, while denying any evidence of decoupling could strengthen 
the case for continued multilateralism. Some interpretations of recent 
evidence may thus have been inﬂuenced by wishful thinking—or even 
by deliberate one-sidedness.
For some years during the mid-noughties, decoupling became a 
popular concept in parts of the learned literature. For instance, in Google 
Scholar, the use of 'decoupling', 'economic' and 'Asia' has risen from 
below 1,000 hits in 2003 to 1,470 in 2009. Interest seems to have declined 
somewhat during the global ﬁnancial crisis, at least based on internet 
searches according to Google Insights for Search. 
With this background, this article discusses the relationship between 
objective empirical evidence and subjective rhetorical patterns, that is, 
how evidence is utilized to support analytical conjectures or to tell stories 
of recent developments. A major point will be to demonstrate how difﬁ-
cult it is to ﬁnd robust evidence for or against decoupling. In this context, 
we will also present some fresh evidence on the possible decoupling of 
East Asia. Instead of pursuing the established way of using trade data 
to identify any degree of decoupling, we take the more unusual route, 
to work with GDP data. We do this because of the strong supply-chain 
linkages among East Asian economies that create many intraregional, 
intermediate good trade ﬂows, but 'hide' the true extent of external 
dependence of East Asian economic performance. Moreover, there is 
reason to believe that tendencies of coupling or decoupling are related to 
periods of global crisis or external shocks. With respect to the recent past, 
some argue that the end of the 'sunshine period' of the global economy, 
namely the global economic crisis that seems to have culminated in the 
closure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, has meant an end for 
any decoupling of East Asia, and that strong East Asian exporters such 
as Japan and South Korea have been even more vulnerable to shrinking 
global demand than many Western economies. However, it has also been 
said that the strong recovery of export-oriented economies like South 
Korea, or the successful Chinese recovery program that has helped the 
whole region, actually provide evidence of a swift return of decoupling 
(e.g., Oakley 2009). We therefore include recent GDP data in our analysis 
and look for changing decoupling trends before and during the crisis.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: ﬁrst, we present a short 
overview of major strands of the available literature on the decoupling 
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of East Asia and argue that the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. We 
will look into different data sources and analytical methods used to 
see why. Second, we introduce our own approach, using GDP data to 
look at decoupling phenomena. Namely, we follow Fidrmuc and Ko-
rhonen (2009) to look at the international correlation of business cycles 
by identifying and interpreting moving correlations among selected 
Asian economies with regional and extra-regional economies. We will 
present our data and calculations, not because we consider this analysis 
necessarily superior, although we consider the use of GDP data to be 
less problematic than to rely on trade data, but to demonstrate the subtle 
difﬁculties in interpreting results properly. Third, we will discuss why 
the debate of decoupling should rather be seen as a political-economic 
phenomenon, in which interests play a major role. As such, this debate 
presents interesting similarities to the earlier debate of a ﬂying geese 
pattern of economic development in East Asia. We conclude that the 
economic analysis of regional economic relations of East Asia should 
involve more works that incorporate a political-economic dimension. 
While leading think-tanks in the region and those that study the region 
mostly employ a narrow economic perspective, they should widen their 
agenda to incorporate the broader concerns of political economy. 
The Decoupling of East Asia: Available Empirical 
Evidence
The basic problem with respect to identifying evidence for (or against) 
the decoupling thesis is that the very term decoupling is not strictly 
deﬁned. It has no foundation in economic theory, and in that respect it 
is similar to a loose term like 'competitiveness'. If one deﬁnes competi-
tiveness as the sustainable ability of an entity to compete proﬁtably on 
world markets, it is quite open which variables can signal such a lasting 
ability. Moreover, although one frequently speaks of the competitive-
ness of a nation, it can indeed be questioned whether it is meaningful 
to designate countries as (un)competitive, as Krugman (1994) has em-
phatically argued. For decoupling, the void of a theoretical foundation 
can be perceived when noting that economic theory does not allow 
a clear prediction whether more economic integration through trade 
and other activities should lead to coupling or, indeed, decoupling of 
economic areas (see Kim, Lee & Park 2009: 3, and the literature quoted 
there); growing trade interdependence could be considered to cause 
more spillovers, for instance in terms of aggregate demand, technology 
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spillovers or the effects of price changes. This would imply a stronger 
co-movement of economies, that is to say, coupling. However, economic 
integration may also increase specialization, as the opening of coun-
tries towards the world economy forces them to concentrate on their 
respective competitive advantages, which are necessarily different from 
those of other countries. This would imply less co-ﬂuctuation among 
economies. Finally, it is also conceivable that the outcome depends 
on certain structural characteristics: for instance, when intra-industry 
trade is dominating between two economies, one might expect a high 
positive correlation among them, as their co-movement is shaped by 
similar factors; for a dominance of inter-industry trade, the opposite 
may be expected.
Decoupling can also mean different things to different observers. 
Starting from a 'rough and dirty' deﬁnition that (de)coupling is about 
whether the linkages between two areas (such as world regions or 
national economies) deepen or loosen, the ﬁrst issue is which kind of 
interactive variables should be considered as appropriate proxies for a 
(de)coupling of economic areas. One may ﬁrst want to distinguish real 
and ﬁnancial economic interactions. In a wider sense, other ﬂows also 
may be considered, such as labour migration, the number of exchange 
students, tourism, translations of books, ﬁlm showings, etc. 
Financial market-related data is often used to discuss (de)coupling in 
the East Asian region, originating from the interest in investment op-
portunities, but also from the perspective of conditions for further mar-
ket or institutional integration in the ﬁnancial/monetary sphere. With 
respect to ﬁnancial ﬂows between various Asian economies, portfolio 
ﬂows within the region have been increasing, but they are still quite 
low compared to interregional activities. Nevertheless, major ﬁnancial 
prices, such as interest rates, bond yields and stock market valuations, 
have been converging in recent years (Kawai 2009: 4). While this is im-
portant news for investors or for policymakers interested in ﬁnancial 
market structure, it is much less clear what this means for (de)coupling 
in a more limited sense. Financial market integration or coupling is 
neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient condition for real market integra-
tion or coupling. It is not necessary, because real economic activities 
can function as a substitute for rather closed ﬁnancial markets that are 
hardly integrated. Nor is it sufﬁcient, because while one would expect 
ﬁnancial price alignment in strongly integrated ﬁnancial markets, this 
may be compatible with very divergent production structures and 
relationships.
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There is no obvious theory-based argument whether, in the nar-
rower context, real or ﬁnancial transactions should be more important 
for (de)coupling. It is tempting to argue that real variables better cover 
the concept that economic regions are possibly linked through their 
peculiar production structures and the resulting ﬂow of goods. From 
that perspective, trade and investment ﬂows are the prime candidates 
to examine to study decoupling. However, real economic structures 
may also be considered as a manifestation of more underlying ﬁnancial 
variables, such as the propensities to save and invest. Financial market-
related variables like the intensity of capital transfers, the synchronicity 
of exchange rate movements and interest rates or the co-movement of 
stock market evaluations would be phenomena to look for.
On a different level, the concept of (de)coupling always implies a 
comparison of an in-group with an out-group, for instance the relations 
among the Northeast Asian economies in comparison to their relations 
with Western advanced economies. This is more complex than may 
seem at ﬁrst sight. In the literature on the intensity of regional interde-
pendence in Paciﬁc Asia, this has been well studied. Several authors 
and the public media have noted the growing trade ﬂows between 
Asian economies for a long time. However, a growing volume of trade 
between two economies, A and B, may simply be due to the fact that 
A's propensity to trade with the rest of the world is increasing and/or 
that B's propensity is increasing, or indeed that world trade is grow-
ing and A as well as B are simply following this trend. Compared to 
noting the change of trade volumes between A and B over time at face 
value, one should thus at least quote it in relation to the development 
of total world trade; this ratio is often called the absolute measure of 
trade intensity. In the relative measure of trade intensity, this value is 
related to either the overall export propensity of the exporting entity 
A or to the overall import propensity of the importing entity B. In case 
of the double-relative trade intensity measure, both scaling factors 
are applied. The consequences of using these concepts can be quite 
surprising. According to a quantitative analysis by Urata (2004), the 
absolute trade intensity of East Asia increased from 5.4 per cent to 11.3 
per cent between 1980 and 1999. That means that East Asia's share of 
intra-regional trade among world trade almost doubled. However, the 
trade intensity index according to the double-relative measure actually 
declined from 2.56 to 2.25 during the same period. In other words, it is 
true that East Asian economies intensively trade with each other; this 
is signalled by a value of greater than 1. Actually, the trade intensity is 
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more than twice the level that one would expect, on the background of 
the general export and import propensities of the regional economies. 
However, this (double-relative) intensity has not risen further between 
1980 and 1999; the impressive growth of intra-regional trade is simply 
due to the considerable outward orientation of East Asian economies, 
irrespective of regional or extra-regional trading partners. Urata's 
conclusions, which also hold for direct foreign investment relations as 
may be noted in passing, are in line with earlier studies using a similar 
methodology. For instance, in an early study of this type, Frankel (1997; 
based on his earlier papers) noted a U-shaped trend curve of East Asian 
intra-regional trade intensity in recent decades, with the rise in the 
later post-war period reﬂecting a rebound of regional trade links that 
were cut through the Paciﬁc War. He was dubious whether the trend 
would continue. For our topic at hand, it is noteworthy that operational 
speciﬁcations of (de)coupling can be very sensitive with respect to the 
methodology employed to cover 'intensity'.  
Methodological issues can get much more complex. Let us consider 
the most straightforward way to discuss (de)coupling further, namely 
with respect to international trade in terms of some of the methodo-
logical issues involved. A major problem with trade ﬁgures is that they 
encompass both ﬁnished and intermediate goods (apart from services). 
Particularly, intermediate goods are not necessarily meant for the market 
of the country into which they are imported, but they may be used up 
in production processes and may eventually end up as exports headed 
for ﬁnal consumption in a third-country market, possibly outside of 
the region. The difference between the two types of goods can be quite 
signiﬁcant. According to UN trade data collected by Pula and Peltonen 
(2009), the volume of intra-regional exports of ﬁnal goods within East 
Asia actually declined from 2.0 per cent of regional GDP in 1998 to 1.7 
per cent in 2006, while intermediate goods exports rose signiﬁcantly from 
8.9 per cent to 14.8 per cent of GDP (see Table 1). In other words, insofar 
as the intra-regional growth of trade in goods grew stronger than GDP 
during the reporting period, this was entirely due to the rise of trade in 
intermediate goods, which are particularly suspect as they eventually 
may be heading for third-country markets. Thus, simply pointing out 
the strong growth of intra-regional trade is far from sufﬁcient.  
A way out of this problem is offered by input-output analysis. An 
input-output (IO) table supplies information on the structure of rela-
tionships. Normally, IO tables are set up for domestic economies, dif-
ferentiating between different industries and showing to what extent 
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inputs, including products from various industries, are used for the 
production of outputs, including industry-speciﬁc output. In the case 
of international IO tables, the relationship matrix consists of imports 
from one country used up in the exports of another country. For the 
Asia-Paciﬁc area, Japan's Institute for Developing Economies (IDE) has 
prepared such an international IO table for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, and 
2000. Generally speaking, international IO analysis allows for interesting 
results. For instance, one can calculate backward linkages through the 
IO relations, that is, asking which production in regional production 
is necessary to allow for production elsewhere when interlinkages are 
considered. One can also extend this analysis and ask to what extent 
demand in a certain country—intermediate and ﬁnal demand—creates 
value added through the production of utilized goods elsewhere, in a 
supply country. This is extremely helpful for the question of decoupling: 
to what extent, for instance, will increased demand in China create 
production and eventually value added in other Asian countries? Pula 
and Peltonen (2009) make use of IDE's IO table and study to what extent 
demand in one country creates value added elsewhere, to answer the 
question whether value added in Paciﬁc Asia is driven by domestic, by 
intra- or by extra-regional demand. In a nutshell, the authors ﬁnd that 
supply sources within the region are still concentrated over the years 
1995, 2000, and 2006, but China has started to occupy a more important 
role than Japan. With respect to value-added generation, the role of 
domestic ﬁnal demand has declined, but its share has been taken up 
by extra-regional demand (coupling) rather than intra-regional demand 
(pp. 22-24); reliance on trade for value-added creation is signiﬁcantly 
TABLE 1: Final and Intermediate Good Exports in East Asian Trade
in per cent of GDP
Total Final Intermediate
1998 2006 1998 2006 1998 2006
Export to G3 countries (US, 
EU-15, Japan)
16.2 18.7 6.4 6.0 9.8 12.7
within that to US 7.3 7.8 3.2 2.9 4.2 4.9
to the EU 5.1 6.7 1.8 2.0 3.4 4.8
to Japan 3.7 4.1 1.5 1.1 2.3 3.0
Intra-regional exports 11.0 16.5 2.0 1.7 8.9 14.8
within that to China 6.2 12.1 0.8 0.6 5.5 11.5
Rest of the World 7.2 10.2 2.1 2.5 5.1 7.7
Total exports of goods 34.4 45.3 10.5 10.2 23.8 35.1
Memo item
Exports, goods and services    42.8    53.4
Source: Adapted from Pula and Peltonen (2009): 12.
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less than suggested by face-value trade data. All these insights make this 
approach of looking behind the superﬁcial and—because of interlink-
ages—bloated trade data ('bubble trade') particularly valuable. 
Why is this approach so rare, then, although it can be considered one of 
the few available that treats the problem of structural interrelationships 
of trade properly? One issue is that the effort necessary to prepare such 
a table is considerable. This is the reason why the latest Asian IO table 
is from 2000 (the 2005 table is expected to be made public in mid-2011). 
Timely information, for instance covering the impact or responses to 
the global ﬁnancial crisis, thus cannot be expected. Pula and Peltonen 
(2009) try to tackle this hurdle by updating the Asian IO table at least 
to 2006. Basically (for details, see their appendix 2), they use reported 
import data to update the cells of the trade matrix between the various 
countries, taking change towards intermediate goods trade into con-
sideration. While testing for plausibility, of course this procedure can 
only be second best, because potential structural changes cannot be 
adequately covered. Another limitation of the IO approach is that it is 
restricted to the 'mechanics' of the trade relationship. For instance, for 
the individual cells of the matrix, which contain information on imports 
from one country used for the production activities of another country, 
it is assumed that these relationships are ﬁxed for the time being, with-
out substitutability, irrespective of price changes or anything else. This 
also implies that only the 'direct' trade effects are considered, while the 
implications of wider macroeconomic linkages such as employment 
changes or ﬁnancial market interactions are not covered.
A very basic alternative to utilizing trade data is to study the poten-
tial role of (de)coupling through GDP data. In a way, all the potential 
macro and micro effects of economic interlinkages, including ﬁnancial 
market interaction, are eventually covered in the (co-)movement of 
GDP. This is a major advantage of using it in comparison to trade-re-
lated approaches. Some deﬁnitions of decoupling are actually geared 
towards such an understanding. For instance, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) deﬁnes decoupling as 'the emergence of a business cycle 
dynamic that is relatively independent of global demand trends and that 
is driven mainly by autonomous changes in internal demand'. With this 
deﬁnition, it is understood that GDP will always show some movement 
due to business cycle phenomena. From this perspective, (de)coupling 
can never be deduced from the raw data of GDP co-movement. Rather, 
the effects of business cycle co-movement, also in relation to other world 
regions, have to be statistically eliminated one way or another. How to 
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do this obviously creates a considerable number of questions and leads 
to potentially divergent results. In the following section, we will use this 
approach to illustrate some of these issues.
Illustrating an Empirical Approach:  
Model, Data and Results
To discuss the issue of analyzing phenomena of (de)coupling with 
GDP data, we start with a conjecture based on the ADB deﬁnition of 
coupling introduced above. If one ﬁnds an 'emergence of a business 
cycle dynamic that is relatively independent of global demand trends 
and that is driven mainly by autonomous changes in internal demand' 
(ADB 2007: 66), this would be considered evidence for decoupling as 
a secular trend beyond business cycles. As a counter-proposition, any 
observed decoupling could primarily be limited to speciﬁc parts of a 
cycle: decoupling during upturns (and re-coupling during downturns). 
During upturns, some group of countries may be able to make par-
ticularly good use of the benign economic environment, grow strongly 
and develop ever-stronger links amongst each other, thus effectively 
decoupling from the development of other economies to some extent. 
During common downturns, which may originate on the group level—
like the Asian ﬁnancial crisis—or on the global level—like the recent 
global ﬁnancial crisis—this group of countries may be subject to strong 
downward pressure, thus actually re-coupling with the development of 
other economies to some extent. In the ﬁrst case, the proposition could 
be called the secularity thesis of decoupling, in the latter case, the cy-
clicality thesis, although this does not need to refer to a strictly deﬁned 
and rigorously identiﬁed business cycle. 
Inspired by the approach of Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009), we use 
GDP data to identify and interpret a correlation of business cycles be-
tween various East Asian economies and with major external economies. 
We have chosen China, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore 
as regional economies and related them to the US, Germany, France, 
Italy and the UK as Western advanced economies. We ﬁrst calculated 
moving correlations of real GDP growth ﬁgures, using nominal GDP 
and the GDP deﬂator from the International Financial Statistics of the 
IMF (see IMF no date). The GDP data used is a de-trended, i.e. seasonally 
adjusted, quarter-on-quarter real growth rate with a four-year moving 
window. Put differently, we look at whether the GDP in two countries 
moves in the same direction—without being able to say which country 
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follows the other—or whether the relationship is due to some other 
country, some other factor or even whether it is purely coincidental. 
To see such a relationship, the GDP data is pre-arranged in three ways. 
First, the data is smoothened through averaging; otherwise, the changes 
seem too erratic. Second, a general growth trend is cut out: if one coun-
try is growing, another is shrinking, and this should not be considered 
when looking for the relationship of ﬂuctuations. Third, inﬂation (or 
deﬂation) is adjusted, as one would be interested in the relationship of 
the real economies. A second, related approach is a trend analysis of 
the data, trying to identify whether there have been changes since the 
early 1990s due to the so-called Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and the global 
(ﬁnancial) crisis that started in 2007, with its culmination in September 
2008 (Lehman collapse). We do this by accounting for the two crises 
and the intermediate period, which may have started a move towards 
decoupling, as dummy variables in a panel regression of the de-trended 
GDP growth of China and South Korea. 
First, we turn to the correlation of GDP growth rates. As these values 
ﬂuctuate quite widely, we use four-year averages to smoothen them. 
For an illustration, Table 2 presents a small number of the bilateral 
pairs under review. To detect coupling and re-coupling as processes, 
it is important to look at the positive or negative slope of the curves in 
the following graphs, while it is less important whether the curves are 
in positive or negative territory. For instance, in the South Korea-US 
relationship, the reported correlation reached about 0.4 around early 
2000 (see Table 2b). Until late 2003, there was still a slightly positive 
relationship of GDP development between both countries, but the more 
important message is that this relationship has become weaker, that 
is, both countries have started to decouple, visualized in a descend-
ing graph. For the important US-Japan relationship, only from 2005 to 
2008 does one notice a rather strong decoupling, achieved through the 
comparably strong US growth and the somewhat lukewarm recovery of 
Japan (Table 2a). During the recent global crisis, however, there was a 
signiﬁcant re-coupling. As for South Korea and the US, one also notices 
some decoupling around the mid-2000s, followed by a strong re-cou-
pling during the crisis. Between China and South Korea (Table 2c), there 
has been a very strong intra-regional coupling due to the pronounced 
dependency of South Korea on China's growth in recent years. Finally, 
for the increasingly important US-China link (Table 2d), there seems to 
have been no strong trends in recent years; however, since about 2006 
there is some re-coupling. 
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The small survey already shows that it is quite difﬁcult to reach con-
clusions on whether there is a persistent tendency of (de)coupling in 
either direction. Generalizing to some extent, our ﬁndings from calculat-
ing the co-movements of GDP growth are as follows: broadly speaking, 
correlations between East Asia and the West are rather low. During the 
recent crisis, correlations with the West rose signiﬁcantly, particularly 
for Japan, but also for others. For China, correlations with the West 
increased somewhat during the crisis, but from rather low levels. This 
supports the cyclicality thesis, that is to say, some decoupling during 
upturn movements, but re-coupling during downturns—not based on 
strictly deﬁned business cycles, but on the ups and downs around a 
crisis. Since early 2009, the situation has stabilized somewhat again, the 
TABLE 2:  Four-Year Moving Averages of Real De-trended GDP Growth 
Rate Correlation (1995/1Q~2010/4Q) for Selected Country Pairs
a. Japan—US
b. South Korea—US
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moving correlations showing only small further changes. For the fol-
lowing analysis, we can therefore focus on the period up to early 2009. 
As mentioned before, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009: 7-9) have used a 
similar approach, with a smaller sample of countries, but including India 
as another potential source of 'autonomous' growth, and only using data 
from the fourth quarter of 2005 to the third quarter of 2008. Relating 
China and India to the US, Japan and Germany, they ﬁnd no convincing 
overall correlation. Correlations with the US increased somewhat during 
the recent crisis (~2008) somewhat less so with Germany, however. In 
conclusion, their results are compatible with ours. 
As the general trend is still quite unclear, we turn to another, related 
approach. With the following regression analysis, one tries to statisti-
cally explain the GDP growth of single East Asian countries with that 
d. China–US
c. China–South Korea
Source: Own calculation, based on data from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 
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The dependent variable on the left hand side is a four-year moving 
correlation coefﬁcient ρ of de-trended real GDP of a certain economy 
i with selected countries; in our case, we apply this approach to three 
such countries 'i' in turn, namely China, Japan and South Korea. The 
countries that were selected for comparison are an OECD sample1 of 20 
economies, as well as a group of seven emerging economies from East 
and Southeast Asia. We run the regressions for all countries (OECD 
sample plus emerging economies sample) as well as for the subsamples 
of developed (OECD) and regional (emerging) economies. The dummy 
variable for the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (AFC) consists of the quarters 
1997/3Q to 1998/4Q, while for the most recent global ﬁnancial crisis 
we chose individual dummies for the quarters 2008/Q1 to 2009/Q2. 
The overall time-frame is 1995/1Q to 2009/2Q. Our approach is again 
inspired by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009), who investigate 19 OECD 
countries and six emerging economies with data up to the ﬁnal quarter 
of 2008. We will report to what extent our somewhat wider and more 
recent regressions are compatible with their ﬁndings.
Here, we present results for three economies under investigation, 
namely China, Japan and South Korea. The detailed regression results 
can be found in Appendices 1 to 3. As for China, the data shows a weak 
coupling trend over the long term, that is, since 1995 (the trend variable 
is small and positive, namely 0.056, and this result is highly reliable or 
statistically signiﬁcant, denoted by the three stars after the value in the 
table of Appendix 1). Interestingly, this coupling is not stronger with 
of OECD countries and of emerging economies. Compared to the cor-
relation analysis outlined above, the GDP development of an individual 
country is now related to a whole group of economies. While this might 
also have been achieved with yet another correlation analysis, the 
quest is now for a consistent, statistically reliable trend. Searching for 
such a trend, it is meaningful to ask whether there are peculiarities for 
certain periods, namely for the Asian ﬁnancial crisis and for the most 
recent global ﬁnancial crisis. In a regression analysis, this question can 
be conveniently included by asking, if during such a period, a dummy 
variable turning '1' instead of '0' in all other cases has an identiﬁable, 
statistically reliable inﬂuence on the explained variable. Similar to 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009: 9), we use the following equation for a 
panel regression:
(1)
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emerging East and Southeast Asia than with OECD, as the trend values 
in all three columns (1) to (3) are almost identical and equally signiﬁcant. 
During the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of the 1990s, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant trend 
(which differs from Fidrmuc and Korhonen; see the second row 'Dummy 
for Asian Financial Crisis' in Appendix 1, which does not contain any 
signiﬁcant estimate), while we can conﬁrm their ﬁnding of a positive 
coupling relationship for the recent global crisis, which even increases 
in early 2009 (see the highly signiﬁcant estimates in the following rows, 
in the range of 0.1 to 0.3 in 2008 and more than 0.5 in early 2009). As for 
Japan (Appendix 2), generally speaking, it shows a low, but signiﬁcant 
decoupling trend from emerging East and Southeast Asia, while there 
is no clear longer term tendency with respect to OECD. During the 
Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Japan exhibited some decoupling from OECD, 
but during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, some coupling: the algebraic sign 
for the signiﬁcant Asian Financial Crisis estimates are negative, while 
they are mostly positive in 2008-2009. Results for relations with East and 
Southeast Asia during the recent crisis are mostly not very signiﬁcant. 
Finally, South Korea (Appendix 3), like China, also has a weak positive 
trend with respect to all countries and to the region; this relationship 
is insigniﬁcant for the OECD sample, though. There is a somewhat 
stronger positive link (coupling) during the Asian crisis and during the 
latter part of the current crisis. 
These two approaches by no means exhaust the possibilities of looking 
for the co-movement of business cycles. First, one ﬁnds simple modiﬁ-
cations to the speciﬁcations made: for instance, changing the countries 
under study, changing the mode of calculating (moving) averages or 
which (dummy) variables to use in the regressions. Another option 
is to calculate averages for several countries, for instance looking at 
the correlation of all East Asian countries vis-à-vis the group of major 
Western economies (e.g., ADB 2007). Results may look 'smoother', but a 
lot of meaningful divergence may be hidden behind averaging. Second, 
there are more substantive modiﬁcations or extensions. For instance, 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009) make use of so-called dynamic correlation 
analysis. This approach (Croux et al. 2001) is based on the idea that the 
usual concept of co-movement is too rough; the approach deals with 
the frequency under which variables co-move, possibly at the level of 
business cycle frequencies. While it is difﬁcult to interpret the complex 
results properly, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009: 14) ﬁnd evidence that 
the co-movement between Asia and the West has shifted to business 
cycle frequencies during the recent crisis, which is not in line with the 
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secularity thesis of decoupling. Third, there are still other methods avail-
able to look at co-movement. For instance, the ADB (2007: 76) studies 
whether business cycles between Asia and the G3 (US, Japan, EU-25) 
can be understood to 'statistically cause' each other. The methodology is 
based on the so-called Granger causality, which looks at the movement 
of one variable in terms of it being statistically explained by another 
variable. The causing variable will precede the explained variable, but 
the lag period is not theoretically obvious. The ADB (2007) ﬁnds evi-
dence that after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, but not before, G3 business 
cycles do indeed seem to Granger-cause Asian cycles, but not the other 
way round. This does not seem compatible with the secularity thesis 
of decoupling.
Summing up, while there are many different methodologies, it is hard 
to ﬁnd convincing evidence for a secular decoupling of East Asia from 
the West. It is surprising, therefore, that the thesis has found so much 
interest. We will search for the reasons in the following section.
Discursive Patterns
If it is so difﬁcult to make valid empirical statements about decou-
pling, if there is indeed not even a solid theoretical base to develop 
arguments from, why has the debate become so prominent during the 
mid-noughties? 
One source of the mini-hype is the somewhat lofty analytical contri-
butions of the ﬁnancial sector. Talking about a decoupling of the East 
Asian (ﬁnancial) markets could offer new and arguably imaginative 
investment ideas for clients and could thus help to distinguish one 
from competitors who were also looking for commission fees from 
potential investors. From this perspective, decoupling belongs to the 
same category of neologisms as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), a 
term that was meant to capture the investment opportunities offered by 
major emerging economies. Interestingly, Jim O'Neill, chief economist 
of Goldman Sachs, who invented the term BRICs and gained fame (and 
probably personal income) because of this, was considered the 'main 
cheerleader' of decoupling.2 Particularly in journalism, this background 
of the decoupling debate has been highlighted quite frequently. For 
instance, after the ﬁrst incidents of a global cooling-down in late 2007, 
Dennis Moore of Thomson Financial News quite pointedly argued in an 
article entitled 'Decoupling theory looks dubious after global stocks 
plunge and Fed cuts rates', that 'Decoupling was the latest of the 
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periodic "it's different this time" theories to sweep through the world's 
ﬁnancial markets'.3 It is interesting to note that the term 'decoupling 
theory' is frequently used in publications, but as has been argued above, 
it is quite dubious whether there are any arguments that could safely 
be awarded the title 'theory'. The term 'decoupling debate' seems much 
more appropriate. We agree with Willett, Liang & Zhang (2010), that 
the interest in decoupling issues hardly derives from careful analytical 
thinking, but is rather characterized by 'rapid swings in their popularity 
[that] are due largely to herding in popular mental models and shifts 
in short run correlations' (2010: 1).
However, we want to stress a second aspect here. Apart from the 
arena of ﬁnancial journalism, policy circles have also shown a consider-
able interest in the term in recent years. It could serve as a concept to 
show the strength of East Asian economic dynamism and thus prepare 
the ground for arguments in favour of stronger regional integration. It 
is noteworthy that quite a number of the comparatively sophisticated 
studies on decoupling and its related issues have been published in the 
context of ADB or the Asian Development Bank Institute (for instance, 
Kawai & Motonishi 2005; Rana 2006; ADB 2007; Kim et al. 2009). Actu-
ally, such studies lend the idea of decoupling a considerable degree of 
respectability, also by being quite separated from the somewhat ﬂam-
boyant world of ﬁnancial journalism, which is almost totally disregarded 
in such scholarly contributions. 
It is certainly understandable that think-tanks make an effort to take 
up fashionable terms and use them to move public policy discussions 
in a certain direction. We want to concentrate on one link here, namely 
with respect to the ADB. In this regard, the leadership of personalities 
such as Haruhiko Kuroda, the president of ADB, or Masahiro Kawai, 
the dean of the ADB Institute in Tokyo, seems remarkable. It has often 
been mentioned that Japan, in particular, has encountered considerable 
problems with employing intellectual leadership to forward its agenda 
of promoting further institutional integration in Paciﬁc Asia (Pascha 
2002). We interpret efforts to support studies on decoupling as a means 
to overcome this hurdle. It is of course difﬁcult to present conclusive 
evidence for such a background, but it is well known  that circles close 
to the Asian faction of Japan's Ministry of Finance have for many years 
tried to promote a developmentalist and integration-oriented strategic 
concept for Paciﬁc Asia (Lee 2008).
Such an effort to use certain theory-related (if not theory-based) 
concepts for policy goals is not without problems, however. This is true 
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whenever positive analysis is utilized for normative ends. An exam-
ple is the debate about the so-called ﬂying geese pattern of economic 
development in East Asia. This approach was originally developed by 
a Japanese economist, Kaname Akamatsu, in the 1930s to discuss the 
catch-up process of industrial change and modernization of late-com-
ing economies like Japan. Following reformulations by other Japanese 
economists (for a recent contribution, see Ozawa 2005), the concept 
came to be mainly about the catching-up product cycles of laggard 
economies, ranging from, along the time axis, imports to domestic 
production and exports, much later to be followed by a second import 
stage. Such cycles are related to the industry cycles of more advanced 
and of less advanced economies in a typical pattern:  an old industry 
of an advanced economy is phased out and is taken over by the 'mid-
dle ranking' catch-up economy. While this country is gaining expertise 
and becoming a successful exporter, even less developed countries 
start to take over production in this industry, while the 'middle' coun-
try switches to more capital-, human capital- or technology-intensive 
industries. During this process, all countries involved can proﬁt from 
this staggered pattern of moving into new industries. Should a less de-
veloped country move into a higher value-added industry 'too early', it 
forsakes the full advantages of the international distribution of labour; 
rather, it should wait for a suitable point in time, when a more advanced 
country moves out of some industry. The less developed country then 
moves into this void and is soon exporting upwards into the advanced 
economy, which has vacated this industry, and downwards, to countries 
that are still not able to introduce this industry. Summing up, such a 
pattern explains the staggered industrialization in the East Asian re-
gion, with Japan being ﬁrst to introduce 'old' industries from the West, 
such as textiles during the ﬁrst half of the  twentieth century, later to 
be followed by the 'tiger' economies (South Korea, Taiwan), and even 
later by second-wave emerging economies in Southeast Asia or, most 
prominently by China.
The approach has been quite successful in explaining certain aspects 
of how the industrial development among a group of outward-oriented 
emerging economies has unfolded. However, there are two major prob-
lem areas. One is related to the status of the approach as a proto-theory, 
the other relates to its use for policy-making. First, the approach makes 
unconditioned predictions about how industries will develop, while 
important mechanisms are not satisfactorily covered. For instance, is 
it really necessary to enter a new industry through the import stage? 
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What exactly are the assumptions about the options and limitations of 
entrepreneurs or international enterprises operating in such a terrain? 
Important properties such as the time dimension are not well deﬁned; 
for instance, it is not speciﬁed how long certain phases are expected to 
last. Assumptions about technological advance are not well speciﬁed 
either. Is it possible to technologically leap-frog certain intermediate 
phases, for instance; if not, why not? While the approach may have been 
didactically helpful to understand basic features of earlier developments, 
it cannot be regarded as a workable theory to explain current patterns 
or predict future patterns (e.g., Bernard & Ravenhill 1994; Kasahara 
2004). Despite these theoretical weaknesses, the concept has been used in 
policy circles as an argument to favour a close coordination of regional 
industrial policies. According to the V-shaped 'ﬂying geese' pattern of 
staggered industry cycles, it would have been best for Asian latecomers 
to follow the Japanese lead goose and coordinate their policies with the 
leader, accepting specialization on and belated graduation from less 
advanced industries to proﬁt most from regional distribution of labour. 
From a political economy perspective, some interested actors, certainly 
not all involved in contributing to the concept, misused the concept to 
promote the idea of a Japanese leadership. It is argued for instance, that 
circles close to the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) of Japan had an interest in 'exporting' the Japanese concept of 
an activist industrial policy and in shaping the policy debate in East 
Asian cooperation schemes accordingly (see, for instance, Korhonen 
1994; Hatch & Yamamura 1996).
Comparing the fashionable debate about decoupling and the some-
what older popularity of the ﬂying geese pattern, we feel that both 
concepts face the danger of being misused by interested actors in the 
debate of East Asian regional integration. This potential danger is based 
on common characteristics. First, they make assertions about a stronger 
regional integration than is supported by the current consensus among 
policy circles in the region. Second, both concepts are loosely deﬁned 
and do not have a strong basis in well-supported economic theory, 
which allows them to move well beyond safe levels about empirical 
realities. Third, both can be related to established empirical economic 
methodologies, time series analysis of trade data in the case of the ﬂy-
ing geese approach or business cycle co-variation analysis, for example, 
in the case of decoupling. Statements based on these concepts can thus 
potentially proﬁt from the halo effect of empiricist jargon. This does not 
imply that there is no grain of salt in the concepts. Both deal with the 
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peculiar economic dynamism of the East Asian region, and both can be 
interpreted as interactive models of political and economic exchange on 
a regional level. If such a successful interaction is in line with multilat-
eral trends, it would lead to coupling; if not, one would notice aspects 
of decoupling. 
Nevertheless, why is the debate about regional integration of East 
Asia so vulnerable to analytical hazards? It would go beyond the scope 
of this paper to argue that issues like this would not be able to occur 
or would be less likely in other policy arenas, like the regional integra-
tion debate in Europe or in totally unrelated (economic) policy arenas. 
Nevertheless, we see some properties of the regional integration debate 
on East Asia that seem to make it vulnerable. First, it is well known that 
it is difﬁcult to set up institutional regional integration because of the 
public good properties involved. In the case of the EU, the devastating 
Second World War and the Cold War set conditions that convinced a 
ﬁrst group of Western European economies to move closer together in 
the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and thus realized a 
seed crystal for further integration steps (e.g., Pascha 2005). In the case 
of East Asia, such a major reason and strong urgency to move beyond 
ﬁrst mover disadvantages is not in sight. Thus, there is a clear incentive 
for intellectual leadership to 'artiﬁcially' strengthen the case for integra-
tion, seeking intellectual foundations wherever one can hopefully ﬁnd 
them, possibly beyond the borderline of academically sound argument. 
Second, the public good problem of institutional integration could be 
overcome by strong hegemonic leadership or a coalition with a suitable 
agenda. In the case of Europe, this was fulﬁlled by the German-French 
rapprochement after the Second World War under US patronage. In the 
case of East Asia, there is no clear leadership in the region; one may even 
be tempted to speak of a scramble for leadership among China, Japan 
and, possibly, the US. Under such circumstances, arguments may also 
easily be bloated in order to achieve policy impact. Finally, it should 
also be stressed that the case for further institutional integration is by no 
means self-evident, particularly if one considers the different forms and 
contents such institutional integration might encompass. For instance, 
one can refer to the long debate whether trade arrangements in the region 
would rather be a stepping stone or a stumbling-block for multilateral 
welfare-enhancing trade agreements (Baldwin 2004) or whether East 
Asia can be considered to eventually approach the conditions for an 
optimal currency area (Kawai 2009). Under such circumstances, it is 
again conceivable that there are strong motives for interested parties 
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to try to tilt the public debate in their favour and to bend empirically-
based arguments accordingly.
Conclusions/Summary
In this paper we looked at the decoupling debate from an economic 
and from a political economy perspective. In the economic analysis, the 
authors try to operationalize the term decoupling and to empirically es-
timate its development over the years. We have noticed that there is no 
well-established relationship of the concept of decoupling to economic 
theory, so it is quite open, though not arbitrary, what is understood by 
the term. For instance, there is no clear understanding whether ﬁnancial 
or real economic phenomena are more relevant. Beyond the deﬁnition 
of relevant phenomena, the extent of decoupling is difﬁcult to measure 
as it always involves comparisons across time and with other entities. 
Empirical methods can be quite sophisticated, and it is sometimes dif-
ﬁcult to interpret their results consistently and congenially with a pre-
scientiﬁc understanding of (de)coupling. Looking at various methods, 
we found little evidence to support a secular decoupling hypothesis, that 
is, the proposition that there is a long-term trend towards a decoupling 
of the East Asian region. Rather, we found evidence in favour of a cycli-
cal relationship: decoupling during economic upturns and re-coupling 
during downturns. 
Given this sobering result, we asked about the sources for the strong 
interest in the concept in recent years. One key factor is the activity of 
ﬁnancial analysts, who are always on the lookout for attractive ideas to 
generate and canalize interest in new investment ideas. Second, some 
policy circles in the region have an interest in supporting calls for fur-
ther regional integration with putative empirical evidence. The debate 
for regional integration is particularly prone to such argumentation 
because of the difﬁculties in ﬁnding suitable policies and executing 
them against the public action problem of creating public goods and 
the lack of a clear leadership in the region. The concept of (de)coupling 
and the older one of the ﬂying geese pattern of economic development 
capture some interesting points about the peculiar political and eco-
nomic exchange on the regional level. Nevertheless, we conclude that 
seemingly detached economic reasoning is often subject to over- and 
even misinterpretation and should be accompanied by more political 
economy-based reasoning, capturing the discursive patterns of the 
scholarly-cum-political debate. 
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NOTES
1 Our OECD sample (developed countries group) consists of Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. Our 
seven emerging economies are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand. 
2 D. Oakley, 'Decoupling gains brand new group of cheerleaders', Financial Times, 12 
June 2009, p. 25.
3 D. Moore, 'Decoupling theory looks dubious after global stocks plunge and Fed 
cuts rates', AFXNews Ltd., 22 January 2008. Available from: http://www.forbes.
com/feeds/afx/2008/01/22/afx4559340.html (accessed January 2011).
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APPENDIX 1: China's Business Cycle Convergence
China
(1)All (2)Developed (3)Developing
Trend
0.056***
(0.008)
0.056***
(0.009)
0.055***
(0.015)
Dummy for Asian Finance 
Crisis
-0.003
(0.026)
-0.020
(0.028)
0.052
(0.060)
Dummy for 2008/1Q
0.101**
(0.042)
0.078
(0.052)
0.168***
(0.066)
Dummy for 2008/2Q
0.120***
(0.042)
0.094*
(0.052)
0.194***
(0.061)
Dummy for 2008/3Q
0.189***
(0.041)
0.166***
(0.051)
0.254***
(0.063)
Dummy for 2008/4Q
0.235***
(0.055)
0.206***
(0.068)
0.316***
(0.085)
Dummy for 2009/1Q
0.558***
(0.060)
0.573***
(0.072)
0.514***
(0.110)
Dummy for 2009/2Q
0.521***
(0.060)
0.527***
(0.074)
0.510***
(0.109)
Constant
-0.019***
(0.070)
-0.076
(0.072)
0.145
(0.110)
No. of countries 27 20 7
No. of quarters 34~58 42~58 34~58
No. of observations 1,514 1,140 374
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is moving correlation (4 years) of de-trended real GDP with selected 
countries.
2. Quarterly dummy variables: 2008/1Q~2009/2Q
3. Asian ﬁnance crisis dummy variable: 1997/3Q~1998/4Q
4. (   ) represents Robust Standard Error.
5. *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
6. (1) represents China in relation to all developed and developing countries in the sample, (2) 
represents China with all developed (OECD) countries only, (3) represents China with all
developing group countries only.
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APPENDIX 2: Japan's Business Cycle Convergence 
 Japan
(1)All (2)Developed (3)Developing
Trend
-0.011*
(0.006)
0.002
(0.007)
-0.049***
0.013
Dummy for Asian Finance 
Crisis
-0.159***
(0.022)
-0.222***
(0.022)
0.045
0.044
Dummy for 2008/1Q
-0.090**
(0.045)
-0.028
(0.048)
-0.267***
0.054
Dummy for 2008/2Q
-0.009
(0.048)
0.070
(0.052)
-0.236***
0.038
Dummy for 2008/3Q
0.091
(0.058)
0.226***
(0.055)
-0.294***
0.053
Dummy for 2008/4Q
0.241***
(0.068)
0.379***
(0.078)
-0.159*
0.083
Dummy for 2009/1Q
0.377***
(0.062)
0.517***
(0.071)
-0.029
0.103
Dummy for 2009/2Q
0.333***
(0.065)
0.469***
(0.079)
-0.030
0.100
Constant
0.141***
(0.051)
0.119*
(0.062)
0.210***
0.063
No. of countries 27 20 7
No. of quarters 34~58 42~58 34~58
No. of observations 1514 1140 374
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is moving correlation (4 years) of de-trended real GDP with selected 
countries.
2. Quarterly dummy variables: 2008/1Q~2009/2Q
3. Asian ﬁnance crisis dummy variable: 1997/3Q~1998/4Q
4. (   ) represents Robust Standard Error.
5. *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
6. (1) represents Japan in relation to all developed and developing countries in the sample, (2) 
represents Japan with all developed (OECD) countries only, (3) represents Japan with all developing 
group countries only.
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APPENDIX 3: South Korea's Business Cycle Convergence
Korea
(1)All (2)Developed (3)Developing
Trend
0.014***
(0.006)
0.011
(0.007)
0.025**
(0.011)
Dummy for Asian Finance 
Crisis
0.056***
(0.017)
0.063***
(0.018)
0.031
(0.038)
Dummy for 2008/1Q
0.019
(0.035)
-0.008
(0.039)
0.096
(0.067)
Dummy for 2008/2Q
-0.014
(0.034)
-0.050
(0.037)
0.092
(0.063)
Dummy for 2008/3Q
0.031
(0.033)
0.000
(0.036)
0.120*
(0.065)
Dummy for 2008/4Q
0.068*
(0.038)
0.035
(0.043)
0.165**
(0.072)
Dummy for 2009/1Q
0.224***
(0.052)
0.214***
(0.063)
0.255***
(0.090)
Dummy for 2009/2Q
0.165***
(0.052)
0.131**
(0.064)
0.258***
(0.090)
Constant
0.270***
(0.077)
0.253***
(0.087)
0.317***
(0.112)
No. of countries 27 20 7
No. of quarters 34~58 42~58 34~58
No. of observations 1514 1140 374
Notes:
1. Dependent variable is moving correlation (4 years) of de-trended real GDP with selected 
countries.
2. Quarterly dummy variables: 2008/1Q~2009/2Q
3. Asian ﬁnance crisis dummy variable: 1997/3Q~1998/4Q
4. (   ) represents Robust Standard Error.
5. *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
6. (1) represents (South) Korea in relation to all developed and developing countries in the sample, 
(2) represents Korea with all developed (OECD) countries only, (3) represents Korea with all 
developing group countries only.
Pascha.indd   57 17-12-2011   13:17:22
